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PROTECTING LANDLORD CONTROL OF
TRANSFERS: THE STATUS OF "SOLE
DISCRETION" CLAUSES IN CALIFORNIA
COMMERCIAL LEASES
Susan E. Myster*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the California State Legislature resolved to cod-
ify a point of landlord-tenant law decided in Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc.1 The California Legislature enacted Senate Bill
536 providing that commercial leases may include absolute
prohibitions against transfer or express conditions on land-
lord consent to transfer.2 The Legislature also codified the
results of Kendall and implied a reasonable standard of con-
sent in commercial leases which do not specify the conditions
of landlord consent. 3
Unfortunately, while the legislation resolved many ambi-
guities in case law doctrine, it created many more uncertain-
ties. The California Legislature specifically rejected Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1995.250(c), which would have
authorized lease provisions bestowing the landlord with sole
and absolute discretion in consenting to a tenant's transfer of
the leasehold interest.4 The rejection of this provision, and
the ambiguity of sections 1995.240 and 1995.250, make it un-
clear whether a landlord may enforce a commercial lease's
* Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General,
Criminal Appeals Section, San Francisco; J.D., 1994, Santa Clara University;
B.A. 1991, Whitman College.
1. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.010-340 (West Supp. 1995).
3. Id.
4. Kenneth J. Stipanov, Assignment & Subletting of Commercial Leases
Under the New Statutory Scheme, 8 CAL. REAL PROP. J., No. 4, at 18, 22 (1990).
This type of clause would permit the landlord to refuse transfer of the lease for
any reason, even on arbitrary or unreasonable grounds. Actually, the provision
was titled CCC § 1995.240(c) on the first draft and re-numbered on the second
draft of Senate Bill 536. See generally CAL. STATE SENATE, S.B. 536, 1989-90
Sess. (draft version Feb. 17, 1989). See also CAL. STATE SENATE, S.B. 536 1989-
90 Sess. (Mar. 27, 1989) (reflecting Senate amendments).
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"sole discretion" clause.5 Additionally, the legislation denied
the remedy available in California Civil Code section 1951.4
to leases containing clauses either absolutely prohibiting
transfers or allowing the landlord sole discretion in con-
senting to transfers-suggesting possible disapproval of
these provisions.' These actions of the Legislature have left
the status of commercial lease "sole discretion" clauses in a
precarious and uncertain position.
This article will explore the validity of "sole discretion"
clauses under the new California legislation, given the back-
ground of Kendall's reasonableness standard governing com-
mercial lease transferability.7 This article proposes that "sole
discretion" clauses are enforceable under the legislation,
although their uncertain status invites litigation.8
In order to avoid litigation, this article will propose a
practical solution for landlords who wish to retain absolute
discretion and control over lease transfers without waiting
for the Legislature to amend the code.9 This article will also
furnish a workable explanation of the remedy in California
Civil Code section 1951.4 and explain its relationship to sole
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.240 (West Supp. 1995) provides:
A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may provide
that the transfer is subject to any express standard or condition, in-
cluding, but not limited to, a provision that the landlord is entitled to
some or all of any consideration the tenant receives from a transferee
in excess of the rent under the lease.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995) provides:
A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may require
the landlord's consent for transfer subject to any express standard or
condition for giving or withholding consent, including, but not limited
to, either of the following: (a) The landlord's consent may not be unrea-
sonably withheld; (b) The landlord's consent may be withheld subject
to express standards or conditions.
6. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995). This provi-
sion enables the landlord, at his/her option, to continue operation of the lease
after a tenant breach and collect future rent as it becomes due without any duty
to mitigate rent expenses. Id.
7. See infra part IV.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 141-142.
9. See infra part V. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1995) may
provide a workable solution which will allow landlords to effectively retain sole
discretion over transfer of the lease. This section provides: "A restriction on
transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may absolutely prohibit transfer." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1995). Landlords could place this clause in
commercial leases, and then unilaterally waive the prohibition if a suitable sub-
lessee or assignee was found. Placing an absolute prohibition in the lease pre-
vents the landlord from receiving the benefits of the remedy provided in CAL.
CiV. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995).
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discretion clauses. 10 Finally, this article will propose an
amendment to modify and clarify the law to allow "sole dis-
cretion" clauses, and justify the remedy provided in Cal. Civil
Code section 1951.4 for leases containing these clauses.11
II. BACKGROUND
An examination of the topic's background, and the evolu-
tion which provoked the new legislation governing transfer
restrictions, will aid in understanding the current legislation
and its ultimate impact.
A. Property Lease Overview
Before focusing on the specific clauses of a lease, it is im-
portant to comprehend the basic nature of a lease, and the
various types of leases which exist.
1. Dual Nature of Lease
A lease is both a conveyance and a bilateral contract.12 A
leasehold is an estate in land which grants the lessee the
right of possession.13
Two hundred years ago, a lease was viewed solely as a
temporary conveyance of property interests-essentially a
sale of a term of years. 14 The lessee bore all risks associated
with possession of the property, including responsibility for
accidental destruction of the premises occurring by fire or
otherwise. 15 The lessor did not guarantee the premises were
10. See infra text accompanying notes 145-156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4
was enacted in order to permit landlords to elect to continue the lease after a
tenant breach rather than terminating the tenancy, and to collect rent without
any duty to seek another tenant so long as the tenant's right to possession is not
interrupted. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 1991-92 Regular Sess., Report on
S.B. 256, at 3 (Mar. 19, 1991).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 162-165.
12. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 2
(1980).
13. OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIc PROPERTY LAw 329 (5th ed. 1989). The
term "leasehold" will be used throughout this comment to signify the interest a
tenant holds in leased property/premises, without regard to either the contrac-
tual or conveyance nature of a lease.
14. 3A GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 124-25 (1981). Prior to this time, during the Norman Conquest
of England in the eleventh century until about the fifteenth century when feu-
dalism began to erode, property leases were viewed as contractual in nature.
See JAMES L. WniOKUm, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAw 293-94 (1982).
15. WimOKUR, supra note 14, at 293-94.
84719951
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
habitable or fit for their intended purpose-the motto of real
estate transactions was "caveat emptor."1 6 The tenant ordi-
narily bore responsibility for repairs, and if the parties nego-
tiated any lease provisions such as a landlord's promise to
repair, the courts interpreted the covenant as a promise in-
dependent of the tenant's duty to pay rent.17
Gradually, the law has recognized certain contractual as-
pects of property leases.' 8 Today, the parties to a lease main-
tain a continuous relationship throughout the term of the
lease, with mutual obligations regarding rent, maintenance,
use of the premises, etc. 19 For example, when a leased build-
ing is accidentally destroyed, the courts now find the lease
terminated since the landlord's performance has been ren-
dered impossible.2 ° Moreover, not only have the courts
looked to contract doctrines such as impossibility and frustra-
tion to terminate the lease, in extreme cases they have im-
plied dependent covenants such as the "Implied Warranty of
Habitability" (IWH) to address on-going landlord obligations
to tenants. 21 Nonetheless, not all leasehold covenants are
mutually dependent.
Like a contract, a lease is bilateral; one party's breach of
a covenant may suspend the other party's duty to perform his
or her leasehold covenants.22 Here, the key innovative prin-
ciples are the treatment of a lease as a whole, and the recog-
nition that future rent may be due in the present. For in-
stance, when a tenant abandons the premises and defaults on
rent payments, the courts consider it an anticipatory breach,
16. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 125-27. Caveat emptor is a Latin term for
"Let the buyer beware," a fitting motto for early common law real-estate trans-
actions. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 289 (Unabridged, 2d
ed. 1983). See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12.
17. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 2-3.
18. BROWDER, supra note 13, at 329.
19. WINOKUR, supra note 14, at 293.
20. Id. at 296. This statement concerning the court's analysis assumes no
relevant statute applies; however, most American jurisdictions have enacted
statutes which automatically terminate the lease upon accidental destruction of
the premises. WINOKUR, supra note 14, at 296. The parties may negotiate a
provision in the lease which specifically allocates the risk of loss. Ralph Borelli,
an Industrial and Commercial Real Estate Developer, indicates that generally a
standard lease permits the landlord a certain amount of days to rebuild, i.e., 90
or 180 days. Interview with Ralph Borelli, Industrial and Commercial Real Es-
tate Developer (Feb. 25, 1993).
21. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 3.
22. See id. at 3.
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entitling the landlord to the contractual remedy of money
damages.2 3
Despite these contract elements, it is important to re-
member that a lease is still theoretically both a conveyance
and a contract.24 In fact, the Legislature has strengthened
the conveyance concept of a lease in its protection of residen-
tial tenants. Laws prohibiting retaliatory evictions, ordi-
nances concerning rent control, and regulations governing
public housing all emphasize the conveyance concept of a
leasehold.25
A key issue in determining how completely the contract
model of an on-going relationship with mutual obligations
has taken hold is the recognition of an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing.
2. Basic Leasehold Estates
There are four basic types of leaseholds: a term of years,
a periodic tenancy, a tenancy at will, or a tenancy at suffer-
ance.26 The first type of leasehold is a tenancy for a term of
years. This tenancy has a fixed duration, usually one year or
multiples or divisions thereof, which is determined and
agreed upon by both parties. The second type of leasehold
is a periodic tenancy. This is a tenancy of indefinite duration,
with successively repeating periods of an agreed length.
2 8
The third leasehold is a tenancy at will. This leasehold en-
23. Id. at 3-4. The money award the landlord receives is the remaining rent
due under the lease, minus any rent the tenant has paid under the lease. The
award is also decreased by the amount the landlord could reasonably avoid
through mitigation: i.e., by seeking another tenant. Id. See, e.g., Sommer v.
Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977).
24. Although some of the differences between the conveyance and contract
nature of leaseholds are more noticeable in residential lease situations, most
are equally applicable to the commercial setting. The examples enumerated
here are intended only to highlight the distinctions between the two theories.
25. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 5-6.
26. BROWDER, supra note 13, at 329.
27. DUKEMINIER & KREIR, PROPERTY 425 (3d ed. 1993). Creation of a ten-
ancy of any type is subject to the statute of frauds where applicable. A tenancy
for a term of years terminates automatically on expiration of the agreed term;
notice is not required unless either party desires termination prior to expiration
of the lease. BROWDER, supra note 13, at 342-43.
28. DUKEMINIER & KREIR, supra note 27, at 426. A periodic tenancy may be
from year-to-year, but the most prevalent type is month-to-month. If the ten-
ancy has yearly periods, 6 months notice is required to terminate the lease un-
less controlling statutes dictate otherwise. Most jurisdictions have statutes re-
quiring from 30 days to 6 months notice. If the tenancy has periods of less than
1995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
dures only so long as both parties desire. 29 Finally, a tenancy
at sufferance occurs when a tenant has legitimately gained
possession of the property, but wrongfully remains in posses-
sion. For example, if a periodic tenancy for a term of one
month existed, and the tenant was given thirty-days notice to
vacate the premises, on the thirty-first day the tenant would
be a holdover tenant with the leasehold interest termed a
tenancy at sufferance °30
3. Commercial Versus Residential Leases
There are two primary types of leases: commercial and
residential. While these types are similar in some aspects,
they do not share the same policy considerations.31 Residen-
tial leases typically reflect a higher turnover rate than com-
mercial leases. The lessees in a residential setting are gener-
ally assumed to accept lease provisions without attempting
negotiation; the landlord must have more discretionary pow-
ers in a residential setting, both in choosing tenants, as well
as approving any sublease/assignment arrangements.3 2 In
contrast, commercial lessees are assumed to have greater
bargaining power and negotiate each clause of the lease.
In addition, commercial leases are based primarily on fi-
nancial considerations, whereas a residential landlord may
be concerned with non-financial attributes such as whether
the tenant is quiet, neat, or has pets.33 These differences jus-
tify a distinct judicial treatment for each situation.
one year, required notice of termination is one full period in advance. BROW-
DER, supra note 13, at 343.
29. DUKEMINIER & KREIR, supra note 27, at 427. A tenancy at will could be
terminated without notice by either party at common law. Most jurisdictions
now require some notice-usually 30 days is sufficient. Sale of the property by
the landlord, assignment of the lease by the tenant, or the death of either party
will automatically terminate the lease. BROWDER, supra note 13, at 343-44.
30. DUKEMINIER & KREIR, supra note 27, at 431. A landlord typically has a
choice in dealing with a holdover tenant: s/he may begin a new tenancy under
the same terms as the prior tenancy, or treat the holdover tenant as a tres-
passer and take measures to evict the person. See BROWDER, supra note 13, at
344.
31. See Recommendation Relating to Commercial Real Property Leases: As-
signment and Sublease, 20 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORTS 251, 259 (1990). Due
to the distinct policy considerations of each type of lease, this article will be
limited to an analysis of commercial lease situations.
32. See generally Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal 1985).
33. A commercial tenant may also be concerned with compatibility with
other tenants in order to assure quiet enjoyment; however, commercial leases
are more frequently motivated by finances alone than are residential leases.
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B. Transfer of Leases: Assignment and Sublease
A leasehold may be transferred to another party by
either an assignment or a sublease.34 Both devices purport to
transfer the lessee's right to possession of the premises.
1. Assignment
An assignment is characterized by transfer of the lessee's
entire interest in the leasehold. 35 This transfer creates priv-
ity of estate between the landlord and the assignee.3 6 Figure
1 depicts the landlord-tenant-assignee interrelationship. The
assignee receives and may enforce all covenants of the lease-
hold that run with the land; the landlord can enforce all cove-
nants implied by law and running with the land against the
assignee. 37 However, the assignment does not create privity
of contract between the landlord and assignee. Therefore, the
assignee's duties and liabilities to the landlord terminate
upon abandonment or reassignment.38
Assignment can be made contractually binding under a
third-party-beneficiary (TPB) theory if the assignee expressly
assumes all of the tenant's leasehold obligations. The land-
lord is the legal "beneficiary" of the assumption and cove-
nants under the lease, such as rental payments for the term
of the lease, may be enforced against the assignee. 9
2. Sublease
A sublease is a transfer of an interest that is smaller
than the lessee's remaining interest in the leasehold.4
0 The
crucial element of a sublease is that the sublessor retains a
34. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 553. Technically, a tenancy at will may
not be transferred without destroying the tenancy. While it is important to un-
derstand the two types of transfer available, the distinction between an assign-
ment and a sublease is not germane to the issue posed by this article. For the
purposes of commercial lease transfer restriction clauses, the two types of
transfer behave in the same manner and are treated in the same way.
35. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 553.
36. MYRON MosKovrrZ ET AL., CALIFoRNIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT
PRAcTIcE 181 (1986). Privity of estate is always shared between the landlord
and the person in possession of the entire lease interest, as the quantum of the
leasehold interest the lessee or assignee holds is equal to the leasehold interest
the landlord relinquished.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. DUKEMINIER & K iER, supra note 27, at 404.
1995]
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FIGURE 1
LANDLORD
•iASSIGNEE ... . ,.
reversionary interest in the leasehold estate. The landlord
does not have privity of estate or contract with the sublessee;
rather, the sublessor and sublessee share both privities, as do
the landlord and sublessor."4 In practical terms, the landlord
must seek enforcement against the tenant/sublessor, and the
sublessor can attempt to indemnify the sublessee. In the
same manner, the sublessee must enforce any covenants
against the sublessor, who in turn looks to the landlord. 2
Figure 2 portrays the lessor-sublessor-sublessee
interrelationship.
C. Restrictions on Lease Transfer
There are many types of lease clauses that govern or re-
strict the ability of the tenant to assign or sublease his or her
leasehold interest. There are variations on the various types
of lease clauses, and they are often intermingled and com-
bined.43 The basic types of lease clauses governing transfera-
bility of the leasehold are:
1. Free Alienability. In a free alienability clause, the
lease expressly states the tenant may sublease or assign his
or her leasehold interest at will. Since ambiguous clauses are
41. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 12, at 556.
42. Id. at 556.
43. This article is limited to the problems and issues created by a "sole dis-
cretion" clause, and will not attempt to resolve any ambiguities which inhere in
other types of restrictive lease clauses.
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FIGURE 2
LANDLORD
TEAN SUBLESSEE
construed in favor of free alienability, this type of clause is
clearly permissible under California law.44
2. Silent Consent Standard. Under this provision, the
lease requires the tenant to receive the landlord's permission
to transfer his or her leasehold interest, but does not specify
the standard governing the lessor's decision. The landlord is
not expressly given absolute discretion, nor is s/he explicitly
required to be reasonable. Where no standard of discretion is
specified, the landlord is controlled by contract notions of
good faith and fair dealing, and must specify a commercially
reasonable justification for his or her refusal to permit
transfer.45
3. Express Reasonable Consent Standard. This stan-
dard dictates that the lessor is bound under the lease terms
to standards of reasonableness: s/he may not unreasonably
refuse to permit transfer of the tenant's leasehold interest.
Typically, the phrase "consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld" is applied. This type of clause is clearly permissi-
ble under California law.46
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.210(b) (West Supp. 1995) ("Unless a lease in-
cludes a restriction on transfer, a tenant's rights under the lease include un-
restricted transfer of the tenant's interest in the lease.").
45. See generally Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal 1985).
46. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995) ("A restriction on transfer
of a tenant's interest in a lease may require the landlord's consent for transfer
subject to any express standard... including... [t]he landlord's consent may
not be unreasonably withheld.").
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4. Express Standard for Consent. Any express standard
which is placed in the lease, and initially agreed upon by both
parties, will presumably govern all transfers. 47 For example,
the lease may specify that the proposed company's gross an-
nual profits must be three times larger than the annual rent
total in order to be approved as a transferee.
5. Exceptions to the Consent Requirement. The land-
lord's consent is required to effect a transfer, except in certain
enumerated circumstances. 48 For example, an exception for
tenants transferring within a single commercial complex may
be appropriate since the tenant has been previously approved
by the landlord.
6. Use Restriction. Under a use restriction, the tenant
is limited to certain specified uses of the property, or is pro-
hibited from certain uses which are either enumerated or
generally described.49 For example, a tenant may be prohib-
ited from using the premises for a restaurant.
7. Profit Shift. If the leasehold interest is transferred,
the landlord receives any proceeds from an increased rent, as
well as premiums or fees generated by the transaction. Of
course, the parties may bargain for the tenant to receive sur-
plus proceeds." In practice, a lease may contain a provision
47. The new legislation explicitly permits this type of restriction. CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1995.240 (West Supp. 1995) ("A restriction on transfer of a tenant's in-
terest in a lease may provide that the transfer is subject to any express stan-
dard or condition.").
48. William G. Coskran, Assignment and Sublease Restrictions: The Tribu-
lations of Leasehold Transfers, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 405, 418 (1989). Although
the new California legislation does not specifically deal with this type of clause,
it almost certainly would be permissible as long as the exceptions are explicitly
stated in the lease, since this clause would permit greater alienability than
would an "Express Standard for Consent" clause.
49. Although ambiguities are construed in favor of unrestricted use, the
new California legislation permits the lease to explicitly forbid a change in use
or condition a change in use on an express standard. See generally CAL. Crv.
CODE §§ 1997.210-1997.240 (West Supp. 1995).
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.240 (West Supp. 1995). This type of clause is
permissible under the new legislation. Civil Code section 1995.240 states:
A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may provide
that the transfer is subject to any express standard or condition, in-
cluding, but not limited to, a provision that the landlord is entitled to
some or all of any of the consideration the tenant receives from a trans-
feree in excess of the rent under the lease."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.240 (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
854 [Vol. 35
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stating that excess profit disputes will be referred to
arbitrage. 1
8. Recapture. Transfer is not prohibited, but the lessor
may, upon the lessee's request to transfer the lease, termi-
nate the lease at will and recapture the premises. The tenant
may transfer only if the landlord decides not to exercise his or
her option to terminate the lease. The California Supreme
Court recently upheld this type of clause as legitimate in
Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development
California, Inc.5 2
9. Sole Discretion Consent Standard. Pursuant to this
standard, the tenant must seek landlord approval in order to
transfer his or her interest, but the landlord may refuse at
his or her sole discretion. This standard enables the landlord
to unreasonably withhold consent. The clause typically
states that "consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute
discretion of the lessor." It is not clear, however, whether this
type of restrictive clause is permissible under current Califor-
nia law.53
10. Absolute Prohibition. The tenant is not permitted
to assign or sublease his or her interest in the leasehold es-
tate under any circumstances. Of course, the landlord may
unilaterally waive this provision.54 This type of clause is
clearly permissible under the new California legislation: Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1995.230 states: "A restriction on
transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may absolutely pro-
hibit transfer."
55
D. Motives to Restrict Transfer
A tenant negotiating for lease provisions will attempt to
maximize free transferability of the leasehold. In contrast, a
landlord will attempt to restrict the transferability of the
leasehold. The rationales behind each viewpoint deserve a
closer examination.
51. Ralph Borelli, supra note 20.
52. 826 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1992).
53. This article will attempt to answer whether "sole discretion" clauses are
valid under California case law and legislation. See infra text accompanying
notes 110-144.
54. Nancy L. Murray & Lillian F. Hamrick, Assignment and Subletting in
Commercial Leases: The Impact of the New Civil Code Sections, 13 CEB RE.
PROPERTY LAw REPORTER 65, 70 (1990).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1995).
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1. Tenant Motivations
Tenants that lease commercial property need free aliena-
bility of their leasehold interests in order to maintain busi-
ness flexibility. This interest in flexibility is critical in both
long-term leases and falling real-estate markets. Innumera-
ble events could trigger a desire to transfer the lease: sale of
the business where location is a key variable, a need to ex-
pand or decrease the size of the premises for storage or other
reasons, or corporate or personal reasons for relocating the
business.
In obtaining a loan, a tenant may wish to use his or her
leasehold interest as security. To be valuable as security, the
leasehold interest must be transferable by the tenant so that
if foreclosure occurs, someone else can gain the tenant's inter-
est. Furthermore, if a tenant obtains a loan, perhaps to make
business improvements or expand, the lease must permit
transfer.
2. Landlord Motivations
A landlord will attempt to make the lease provisions re-
garding transfer as restrictive as possible to allow careful
screening of tenants and ensure a steady influx of rental in-
come. A landlord is given considerable discretion in his or her
initial selection of a tenant,56 but unless the landlord care-
fully drafts the lease, any transferee who gains the remaining
leasehold interest may be unknown to him or her and chosen
by the tenant, subject to landlord consent.
Landlords in commercial shopping centers have particu-
larly strong interests in screening potential transferees. If
the periodic rent is based on a percentage of gross sales
formula, the type and success of the new business will have a
considerable effect on a landlord's rental income. A tenant
may have a "drawing" influence, and attract customers to the
shopping center. A substitute tenant for this type of business
must be chosen carefully, since a "drawing" business may
help maintain the profitability of the center and increase the
percentage rents of nearby stores. If the shopping center has
a particular image, the transferee business must be closely
examined to determine if it properly meshes with the
56. The landlord may not engage in discrimination. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West Supp. 1988).
856 [Vol. 35
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center's atmosphere. For example, a landlord of the prestigi-
ous Stanford Shopping Center in Palo Alto would not wish to
have J.C. Penney or WalMart move into the shopping center
as a transferee. In addition, a landlord may also object to a
transferee who is a direct competitor of another tenant's
business.
Another reason a commercial landlord may be concerned
with a particular transferee is that a transferee may increase
the burden or wear on the facilities. For example, use of
heavy equipment may disrupt the business of other tenants,
thus threatening the financial security of the complex. A par-
ticular transferee may also lead to an increase in the demand
for parking spaces, elevator use, electricity, water, and trash
services; each of which may decrease landlord profit or depre-
ciate the premises. 57 The landlord may need to increase in-
surance coverage for the complex, depending on the type of
business involved. The building may require physical altera-
tions of some sort to accommodate the transferee. Perhaps
worst of all, the landlord's real property tax burden may in-
crease if the transfer results in an increase of the assessed
property value.
Ironically, a tenant who initially bargains for free trans-
ferability may find him or herself bargaining with a sublessee
for restrictive terms for many of the reasons discussed above.
The sublessor will also fear the sublessee's breach of the pri-
mary lease, especially a violation for which the sublessor may
be held liable by the landlord. Careful lease drafting can pre-
vent these types of problems from occurring.
E. Legal Status of Restrictive Transfer Clauses
California law is fairly well settled, although it repre-
sents the minority view: a landlord may not unreasonably re-
ject transfer where a lease requires landlord consent to trans-
fer but does not specify the governing standard. However,
the law remains unclear as to whether "sole discretion" stan-
dards are valid and enforceable. An understanding of the
legal history of landlord consent is helpful to an exploration
of the current uncertain status of the law.
57. Coskran, supra note 48, at 421.
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1. Majority Jurisdiction Viewpoint
The common law and majority view (outside California)
on commercial lease transferability provides: (1) a tenant's
interest is freely transferable unless the lease provides other-
wise; (2) if fairly negotiated, express lease provisions prohib-
iting transfer or conditioning transfer on the lessor's sole dis-
cretion are enforceable; and (3) if no standard for lessor
consent is specified, the lessor can withhold consent at his or
her sole discretion.58
California law followed the majority view prior to
Kendall.59 In Kendis v. Cohn,6 ° the lease provision required
landlord consent prior to transfer. Additionally, the lease re-
quired the transferee to be "of good character and repute and
satisfactory to the lessors."61 The trial court found the as-
signee to have met this condition, and deemed the lessor's re-
fusal to consent arbitrary.62 In contrast, the appellate court
found the term "satisfactory to the lessors" to contain a sub-
jective element. 63 The Court of Appeals held that in the ab-
sence of a covenant on the lessor's part not to be arbitrary, the
reasonableness of the landlord's decision was irrelevant.64
In Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc.,65 decided forty years
later, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the common law major-
ity rule. In Richard, the lease required consent of the lessor
to transfer, and provided that any transfer effected without
consent would terminate the lease. 66 The appellate court up-
held the lessor's right to arbitrarily refuse consent to a trans-
fer, and stated the applicable rule as follows: "[W]here a sub-
letting or assignment of the leased premises without the
consent of the lessor is prohibited, he may withhold his as-
sent arbitrarily and without regard to the qualifications of
the proposed assignee."67
58. See generally 21 Merchants Row Corp. v. Merchants Row, Inc., 587
N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 1992); Slavin v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 548 N.E.2d
1226 (Mass. 1990).
59. See generally Richard v. Degan & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App.
1960); But cf Schweiso v. Williams, 198 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Ct. App. 1984).
60. 90 Cal. App. 41 (1928).
61. Id. at 49.
62. Id. at 41.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 67.
65. 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1960).
66. Id. at 265.
67. Id. at 269.
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The California appellate court re-examined the Richard
precedent in Cohen v. Ratinoff.68 The lease in dispute in this
case also required consent of the lessor to transfer, but the
tenant pleaded a cause of action under the theory of breach of
contract.6 9 The court recognized that contractual obligations
of good faith and fair dealing applied to leases and militated
against an arbitrary refusal to transfer. 70 Even though no
standard of consent was specified, the court demanded that
the landlord have a "good faith reasonable objection" to the
assignment or sublease.
71
The court reaffirmed the rule established in Cohen in
Schweiso v. Williams.72 In Schweiso, the lease contained a
provision requiring landlord consent to transfer. The land-
lord refused the proposed transferee without stating reasons,
and demanded a sum of money for his consent to the trans-
fer.73 The court stated the landlord must have a good faith
reasonable objection to the transfer based on the contractu-
ally implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing.74 The
court explained its rationale: "[Dienying consent solely on the
basis of personal taste, convenience or sensibility or in order
that the landlord may charge a higher rent than originally
contracted for have been held arbitrary reasons failing the
tests of good faith and reasonableness under commercial
leases."75 The California Court of Appeals may have followed
in the footsteps of Cohen, a decision from another appellate
division, partially because of the egregious actions of the
landlord (extracting "blood money" as a condition of con-
sent).76 The decisions of Cohen and Schweiso set the stage for
the California Supreme Court's decision in Kendall.
Even where restrictive clauses are enforceable, the scope
of such a clause is strictly construed in favor of transferabil-
ity. Thus, a particular transaction will usually escape the re-
striction unless the clause expressly addresses it. For exam-
68. 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983).
69. Id. at 87-88.
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id. at 89.
72. 198 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Ct. App. 1984).
73. Id. at 239.
74. Id. at 240.
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id.
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ple, courts have held a sublease permissible where the lease
prohibited any assignment, and vice-versa.77
2. Kendall's Implication of Reasonableness Standard
Addressing the issue for the first time, the California
Supreme Court reconsidered the common law rule estab-
lished by Richard and rejected it, in part, in Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc.78 Kendall involved a "silent consent standard"
type clause that required the lessor's consent for transfer but
did not expressly state any standard for consent. 79 The court
characterized the lessor's refusal to consent to transfer as ar-
bitrary, and implied a contractual standard of good faith and
fair dealing upon the lessor.80 The court also cited the policy
behind California Civil Code section 711 against restraints on
alienation.81
The court commented that "[t]he traditional majority
rule has come under steady attack in recent years."82 The
opinion further stated: "A growing minority of jurisdictions
now hold that where a lease provides for assignment only
with the prior consent of the lessor, such consent may be
withheld only where the lessor has a commercially reasonable
objection to the assignment, even in the absence of a provision
in the lease stating that consent to assignment will not be
unreasonably withheld."83 The common law rule presumes
the standard to be one of "sole discretion," whereas Kendall
implies a standard of commercial reasonableness.
77. See, e.g., Cross. v. Bouck, 165 P. 702 (Cal. 1917) (a covenant against
assignment not breached by a sublease); Buck v. Cardwell, 327 P.2d 223 (Cal.
1958) (no breach of a covenant against subleases when one tenant assigns the
lease to a co-tenant).
78. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal 1985).
79. Id. at 839.
80. Id. at 849.
81. Id. at 843-49. The Kendall Court acknowledged that a lease is both a
conveyance and a contract. Both the policy against restraints on alienation and
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, in combination with stare decisis based
on the Cohen and Schweiso decisions, prompted the Court's decision to imply a
standard of commercial reasonableness where the lease requires landlord con-
sent but does not specify an applicable standard.
82. Id. at 841.
83. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 842 (Cal 1985). The ju-
risdictions (still a minority) which now so hold include: Alabama, Alaska, Ar-
kansas, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, and New Mexico. Ohio, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Arizona, Colorado, and North Carolina have conflicting authorities.
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The majority in Kendall held that if a tenant bargained
for a reasonableness standard, it would be expressed in the
lease.8 4 There is no reason to imply such a standard into a
lease if it is not bargained. 5 The minority Kendall view im-
plies a standard of reasonableness based on certain policy ra-
tionales: (1) the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing applies to all contracts; and (2) alienability of leasehold
interests is favored, so any restrictions are strictly construed
to allow transferability.
8 6
Despite their modifications of the traditional common
law doctrine, the Kendall decision and its progeny did not di-
rectly hold the parties could not bargain and expressly pro-
vide for a sole discretion standard.8 7 In fact, the Kendall
court noted: "This case does not present the question of the
validity of a clause absolutely prohibiting assignment, or
granting absolute discretion over assignment to the lessor."
88
Thus, while Kendall implies a standard of reasonableness
where no consent standard is specified, it remains unclear
whether "sole discretion" clauses are enforceable in
California.
The Restatement Second of Property adopts the minority
rule on the validity of approval clauses in leases:
A restraint on alienation without the consent of the
landlord of the tenant's interest in the leased property is
valid, but the landlord's consent to an alienation by the
tenant cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a freely
negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an ab-
solute right to withhold consent.8 9
The Comment to the Restatement explains that a landlord
may be understandably concerned about certain qualities of a
tenant, e.g., his or her reputation for meeting financial
obligations.90
Under the Restatement rule, the lessor's interest in the
character of his or her tenant is protected by the lessor's right
84. Kendall, 709 P.2d at 849.
85. See, e.g., F & L Center Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 482 N.E.2d
1296 (Ohio 1984).
86. Kendall, 709 P.2d at 843-45.
87. See generally Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 841 (Cal.
1985).
88. Id. at 844 n.14.
89. REST. 2D PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1977).
90. Id. at comment a.
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to object to a proposed assignee or sublessee on reasonable
commercial grounds.91 The lessor's interests are also pro-
tected by the fact that the original lessee remains liable to the
lessor as a surety even if the lessor consents to the assign-
ment and the assignee expressly assumes the obligations of
the lease.92
It is quite possible that the Restatement view influenced
the Court's decision in Kendall. However, the Restatement
rule goes farther and explicitly permits a "sole discretion"
clause if it is a fairly negotiated portion of the lease. It seems
clear that the California rule following Kendall was to imply
a standard of commercial reasonableness where no express
standard governing lessor consent to transfer was explicitly
stated. The rule with respect to "sole discretion" clauses was
slightly more uncertain and exposed a legal problem in the
commercial landlord-tenant context.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS LEGAL
RELEVANCE
It is important to explain the uncertainty and ambiguity
which the new Civil Code sections create in regard to "sole
discretion" clauses. Additionally, this article explores the im-
portance of this problem, and its resolution, to the legal com-
munity and commercial landlords and tenants.93
A. Ambiguity of New Statutes
In 1989, the California Legislature resolved to remedy
questions left unanswered by prior California case law. The
California Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that
Kendall "left unresolved ... [w]hether a lease may absolutely
prohibit assignment or grant absolute discretion to a land-
lord to prohibit an assignment."94 Senate Bill 536 proposed a
series of provisions to resolve the issue by allowing the lessor
to absolutely restrict any transfer, or to restrict transfers
upon express conditions or standards which are reasonable at
91. Id. at 112-13 n.7.
92. Peiser v. Mettler, 528 P.2d 953, 957 (Colo. 1958); Samuels v. Ottinger,
146 P. 638, 639 (Cal. 1915).
93. See infra part III.B.
94. Commercial and Industrial Leases: Assignments and Subleases, CAL.
STATE SENATE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, at 3 (1989) [hereinafter Judici-
ary Report] (held on May 16, 1989).
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the time of the lease agreement and the proposed
assignment.9 5
Unfortunately, the question of whether "sole discretion"
clauses are permissible was not explicitly addressed, except
in a bill that the legislature ultimately rejected.9"
The policy justifications which provoked the initial legis-
lative proposal were: (1) parties should be able to contract
freely for any term, so long as the result does not amount to
an adhesion or unconscionable contract; and (2) once an
agreement is made, parties should be able to rely on and en-
force the agreement, unless a term has proven to be
unreasonable.97
In support of its recommended statutes, the California
Law Revision Commission stated: "The statute should make
clear that the right to agree to limitations on transferability
includes the right to agree that the tenant's interest may not
be transferred without the landlord's consent, which may be
given or withheld in the landlord's sole and absolute discre-
tion."98 The intent of the Bill's sponsors seems to have in-
tended to favor the validity of "sole discretion" clauses.
However, the Law Revision Commission recognized that
absolute prohibitions on transfer, and particularly "sole dis-
cretion" clauses, might provide a pitfall for commercial ten-
ants without equal bargaining power.99 The tenant's only re-
course would be to challenge the provision as an
unenforceable adhesion contract or an unconscionable
clause. 100 The Commission noted: 'This of course presents a
paradox: If the 'mom-and-pop' tenant could not afford a law-
yer to negotiate a lease, how could they afford a lawyer to
95. Id.
96. MURRAY & HAMRiCK, supra note 54, at 65, 67. The authors note the
initial Senate version contained section 1995.250(c), which authorized a restric-
tion providing that "[tihe landlord has absolute discretion to give or withhold
consent, including the right to unreasonably withhold consent." Id. However,
the code section indicated here arose only on the second amendment. The orig-
inal bill listed this provision as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.240(c); the second
(amended) version changed the numbering to section 1995.250(c). On its third
reading, the provision was stricken. See supra note 4.
97. MuRRAY & HAMRiCK, supra note 54, at 65, 67.
98. Judiciary Report, supra note 94, at 6.
99. Recommendation Relating to Commercial Real Property Leases: Assign-
ment and Sublease, 20 CAL. L. REviSION COMM'N REPORTS 251, 258 (1990) [here-
inafter Recommendation].
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995). See also Recommenda-
tion, supra note 99, at 258.
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contest a lease clause?"10 1 Nonetheless, the Commission pro-
posed authorization of "sole discretion" clauses. 102
After the initial proposal of Senate Bill 536, the Legisla-
ture rejected California Civil Code section 1995.250(c), which
expressly allowed "sole discretion" clauses in commercial
leases.1 0 3 Thus, the question of whether a lease may contain
a "sole discretion" clause remains unanswered.
Another factor which leaves in question the status of
"sole discretion" clauses under the new legislation is that the
remedy provided for by California Civil Code section 1951.4
is not available to leases containing either absolute prohibi-
tions on transfer or "sole discretion" clauses. 10 4 Under Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1951.4, the landlord may keep the
lease in force and require continued payment of rent notwith-
standing abandonment by the tenant. This "lock-in" option is
available only if the lease expressly incorporates the remedy
and allows a tenant, either expressly or impliedly, to reason-
ably assign or sublet. 105 While this seems to indicate legisla-
tive disapproval of "sole discretion" clauses, the absence of
any statutes that explicitly deal with these clauses is
puzzling. 10 6
B. Relevance to the Legal Community
Resolution of the legal status of "sole discretion" clauses
in commercial leases will affect many sectors of the commu-
nity: lawyers, landlords, and tenants.
Lawyers have a significant stake in this issue, as they
must advise their clients, often commercial landlords or ten-
ants, of what actions are appropriate in particular situations.
Resolution of this problem will impact the way in which law-
yers advise landlords and tenants of their rights and duties.
Lawyers must also draft the lease clauses, or negotiate to al-
101. Judiciary Report, supra note 94, at 8.
102. See Recommendation, supra note 99, at 267.
103. See generally MURRAY & HAMRICK, supra note 54.
104. See generally id.
105. Judiciary Report, supra note 94, at 8.
106. The legislative history in this section of the article is provided only as
background, to gain an understanding of the treatment of "sole discretion"
clauses. See infra text accompanying notes 123-156 (analyzing Senate Bill
536's legislative history and the significance of the Legislature's denial of CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1992) remedy for leases containing "sole dis-
cretion" clauses).
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ter the lease provisions, in order to either maximize restric-
tions on transfer or maximize the freedom to transfer the
leasehold.
Landlords will be particularly interested in a resolution
of this problem. Currently, a lease provision granting the
landlord "sole discretion" is in an uncertain position and may
invite litigation. In order to assure a steady rental income,
landlords should be able to maximize restrictions on
transfer. 107
Tenants will be equally interested in a resolution, so that
they may bargain for a provision rather than attempting to
litigate their way out of a tenuous restriction. As long as ten-
ants are aware of the valid restrictions on transfer, they may
knowledgeably negotiate lease provisions and avoid those
which may be disadvantageous. Moreover, current uncer-
tainty in the law may persuade landlords to adopt more re-
strictive prohibitions on transfer, which anomalously are
permissible under current law.
IV. ANALYSIS
It is important to explore the language of the new stat-
utes, and the legislative intent which prompted them, to de-
termine whether "sole discretion" clauses are permissible in
commercial leases. This article will also analyze the inter-
play of the remedy provided in California Civil Code section
1951.4, and the significance to practitioners of its denial of
application to "sole discretion" clauses. 108
A. Plain Meaning Interpretation of California Civil Code
Sections 1995.240 and 1995.250
Although the "plain meaning" rule is in disfavor as the
sole means of statutory interpretation, 10 9 it is useful to ex-
amine the language of the statute and the meaning it sug-
gests before resorting to legislative analysis to discover the
intent of the framers.
107. See supra part II.C (describing landlord motives to (safely) restrict
transfer of commercial leaseholds).
108. See infra part IV.C.
109. See generally Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. County of Riverside, 767 P.2d
1148, 1154-55 (Cal. 1989); American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr.
280, 282 (Ct. App. 1989); Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. and
Develop. Comm'n, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (Ct. App. 1984); Pennisi v. Depart-
ment of Fish & Game, 158 Cal. Rptr. 683, 687 (Ct. App. 1979).
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Clearly, leases may absolutely prohibit transfer. Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1995.230 states: "A restriction on
transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may absolutely pro-
hibit transfer."110 However, the status of "sole discretion"
clauses is not so explicit as there are no statutes which specif-
ically mention this standard.
California Civil Code sections 1995.240 and 1995.250 are
the only statutes which conceivably cover the topic of "sole
discretion" clauses. Both of these sections deal with lease re-
strictions which may be placed on transfer. California Civil
Code section 1995.240 states:
A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a
lease may provide that the lease is subject to any express
standard or condition, including, but not limited to, a pro-
vision that the landlord is entitled to some or all of any of
the consideration the tenant receives from a transferee in
excess of the rent under the lease.11'
The question of interpretation is whether the phrase "any ex-
press standard or condition" can encompass the subjective
standard of a landlord's sole discretion.
California Civil Code section 1995.250 contains nearly
the same language as the preceding subsection:
"A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a
lease may require the landlord's consent for transfer sub-
ject to any express standard or condition for giving or
withholding consent, including, but not limited to, either
of the following:
(a) The landlord's consent may not be unreasonably
withheld.
(b) The landlord's consent may be withheld subject to
express standards or conditions.
1 12
The query for both sections then, is whether the phrase "ex-
press standard(s) or condition(s)" includes or excludes "sole
discretion" clauses.
The terms in the phrase "express standard(s) or condi-
tion(s)" seem to imply explicit limitations or delineations, but
the terms are not self-evident. Therefore, an examination of
external sources is illuminating.
110. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1995).
111. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.240 (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
112. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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According to Black's Law Dictionary, a standard is "[a]
measure or rule applicable in legal cases such as the 'stan-
dard of care' in tort actions."113 Unfortunately, the terms
"measure" and "rule" are fairly ambiguous, but they offer
some guidelines for understanding a "standard." Under this
definition, the "standard" may be an applicable rule which is
fairly complex. For example, the "reasonable person" stan-
dard in tort cases is essentially the standard of care the ordi-
narily prudent person would follow in similar circum-
stances.1 4 This "standard" is ambiguous and subject to
various interpretations, yet it qualifies as a "standard."
The word "condition" is defined by Black's Law Diction-
ary as: "an event, fact, or the like that is necessary to the
occurrence of some other, though not its cause; a prerequisite;
a stipulation."" 5  Here, a "condition" is almost anything
which must happen before another thing (here, presumably a
transfer) may occur.
The statutes incorporate the phrase "standard(s) or con-
ditions," suggesting that only one of these words need accu-
rately describe the lease clause. Piecing the two definitions
together, the phrase "any express standard or condition" may
be restated as "any rule, measure or prerequisite event or
fact." Both "standard" and "condition" are words modified by
the term "express," which typically means explicitly stated.
Black's Law Dictionary explains the difference between ex-
press and implied conditions:
Conditions are either express or implied, the former
when incorporated in express terms in the deed, contract,
lease, or grant; the latter, when inferred or presumed by
law, from the nature of the transaction or the conduct of
the parties, to have been tacitly understood between them
as a part of the agreement, though not expressly
mentioned. 116
Therefore, the "rule, measure or prerequisite event or fact"
must be explicitly stated in the lease, rather than simply in-
ferred or understood.
113. BLAci's LAw DicTioNARY 1259 (6th ed. 1991).
114. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 134-35 (5th ed.
1990). Note the formulation of the "reasonable person" standard of care here is
for the purpose of example only.
115. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 202 (6th ed. 1991).
116. Id.
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Arguably, a "sole discretion" provision fits within the def-
initions expounded here. A sole discretion clause gives the
landlord absolute discretion and allows him to refuse transfer
for unreasonable or arbitrary reasons. This clause is similar
to the "reasonable person" standard explained earlier in that
it prescribes a general mode of conduct. The prerequisite
event or fact dictated in a "sole discretion" clause is that the
landlord must subjectively approve the transferee prior to
the transfer.
However, opponents of the "sole discretion" clause will
argue that a provision which gives the landlord total power to
approve or deny transfer is not a rule, measure, or prescrip-
tion of a mode of conduct, but rather the lack of any such
prescription. Instead, the landlord is given complete freedom
without any limitations whatsoever. 117 Such freedom cannot
be classified into such a limit-focused definition.
Another factor that militates against inclusion of "sole
discretion" clauses within the phrase "any express stan-
dard(s) or condition(s)" is that such a subjective power essen-
tially allows the landlord to utilize a multitude of implicit
standards. For example, a lessor could place a "sole discre-
tion" clause in the lease and then set an agenda of several
standards which he or she does not disclose, such as: (1) the
transferee must generate fifteen times the amount of rent in
gross income; (2) the transferee corporation must have an es-
tablished track record of at least fifteen years; and (3) the
transferee must not close its business on Sundays. While
these standards may be legitimate if expressly stated in the
lease,"'8 their implicit use is questionable. If the landlord's
"standard" is essentially a hidden agenda, courts are likely to
hold that such provisions do not fall within the language of
California Civil Code sections 1995.240 and 1995.250.
117. See CAL. CIV CODE § 1995.250(c) (West Supp. 1995). While theoretically
the landlord has no restrictions on his right to approve or deny a transfer under
a "sole discretion" clause, s/he is of course subject to anti-discrimination laws.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1988).
118. The language of CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.240-250 (West Supp. 1995) re-
garding "any express standard(s) or condition(s)" would likely encompass these
specific and well-defined situations, especially where the motivations may be
traced to financial or business reasons. The problem arises when the standards
are not spelled out in the lease, although they are perhaps envisioned by the
lessor. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.240-250 (West Supp. 1995)
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The "plain meaning" interpretation of these statutes, as
evidenced from the above discussion, is ambiguous. While
both sides can muster compelling arguments, such uncer-
tainty regarding lease provisions invites unwanted litigation.
Although the legislation in its current state is ambiguous
as to whether "sole discretion" clauses fall within the phrase
"any express standard(s) or condition(s)," the first two drafts
of Senate Bill 536 indicate the legislation's sponsor clearly in-
tended to encompass "sole discretion" clauses. The preamble
of the February 17, 1989 edition reads:
The bill would also specify that a restriction on trans-
fer.., in a nonresidential lease... may require the con-
sent of the landlord for transfer subject to any express
standard or condition for giving or withholding consent,
including, among other provisions, . . . a provision that
the landlord has absolute discretion to give or withhold
consent, including the right to unreasonably withhold
consent. 119
Additionally, the original version of California Civil Code sec-
tion 1995.240 (later changed to section 1995.250) specified:
A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a
lease may require the landlord's consent for transfer sub-
ject to any express standard or condition for giving or
withholding consent, including, but not limited to, any of
the following: (a) The landlord's consent may not be un-
reasonably withheld; (b) The landlord's consent may be
withheld subject to express standards or conditions; (c)
The landlord has absolute discretion to give or withhold
consent, including the right to unreasonably withhold
consent. 
120
The sponsors of the original bill clearly viewed "sole discre-
tion" as a permissible standard as that term is used in sec-
tions 1995.240 and 1995.250. However, the omission of these
statements from the final version of the Bill leaves us with no
explicit pronouncement on the status of "sole discretion"
clauses.
Some might consider the omission of "sole discretion"
clauses to indicate they are clearly not permissible under the
new legislation. After all, if the legislature wanted to include
119. CAL. STATE SENATE, S.B. 536, 1989-90 Sess. (Feb. 17, 1989 draft) Draft
Edition of Feb. 17, 1989, at 1-2 (1989) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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"sole discretion" clauses, it could have explicitly stated so.
This analysis parallels that of the "mischief rule,"121 which
states that if a law is not enacted, we must presume the prior
law governs. Of course, here the rule is inapposite since the
preceding law regarding "sole discretion" clauses is
unclear. 122
B. Legislative Interpretation of California Civil Code
Sections 1995.240 and 1995.250
An examination of a bill's legislative history is often help-
ful in determining the legislative intent behind the bill.
When interpreting a statute, a court is guided primarily by
the legislative intent which motivated passage of the stat-
ute. 123 Courts will also construe the statute against its plain
meaning in order to give effect to the intent of the
legislature. 124
This section will analyze the legislative history of Senate
Bill 536 (1989) in order to determine if the legislature in-
tended to include "sole discretion" clauses within the lan-
guage of California Civil Code sections 1995.240 and
1995.250.125 Many steps of the legislative process, from a
bill's proposal and recommendation, to its final vote on the
Senate floor, indicate something about the legislative intent.
This article will try to glean meaning from several of these
legislative steps regarding the intended disposition of "sole
discretion" clauses. 1
26
The California Law Revision Commission's recommenda-
tion which was submitted with the proposed statutes plainly
states that California Civil Code section 1995.240 does not
121. The United States Supreme Court stated that '[n]o statute is to be con-
strued as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be
construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not
fairly express." Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
122. See infra part II.E (explaining the law governing "sole discretion"
clauses prior to the new legislation).
123. See generally CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1990); Milligan v. City
of Laguna Beach, 670 P.2d 1121, 1122 (Cal. 1983); In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744,
754 (Cal. 1983).
124. See, e.g., California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College
Dist., 621 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Cal. 1981); Mercer v. Perez, 436 P.2d 315, 320 (Cal.
1968); Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917, 923
(Ct. App. 1981).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 127-144.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 127-144.
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cover clauses requiring landlord consent to transfer: "This
section does not apply, and section 1995.250 does apply, to a
restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease that
requires the landlord's consent for transfer. " 127 Thus, "sole
discretion" clauses clearly are not covered by California Civil
Code section 1995.240. 128 Although, as implemented, the
statute's language was unclear as to whether these clauses
were encompassed, the clear intent of the Legislature as to
which clause applies is controlling. 129 Further, there are no
statements in the Senate and Assembly analyses that disa-
gree with the California Law Revision Commission's designa-
tion of California Civil Code section 1995.250 (and not section
1995.240) to deal with clauses requiring landlord consent for
leasehold transfers. 130
In contrast to section 1995.240, California Civil Code sec-
tion 1995.250 was initially proposed in order to expressly per-
mit "sole discretion" clauses.13 1 As Kendall132 left unclear
whether "sole discretion" clauses were permissible, the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission resolved to clarify the am-
biguous state of the law.133 The Commission stated: "The
statute should make clear that the right to agree to limita-
tions on transferability includes the right to agree... that
the tenant's interest may not be transferred without the land-
lord's consent, which may be given or withheld in the land-
lord's sole and absolute discretion. " 134 The originally pro-
posed statute reflected this desire: California Civil Code
section 1995.250(c) specifically allowed "sole discretion"
127. Recommendation, supra note 99, at 166-67.
128. The legislature might later have left both CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.240-
250 (West Supp. 1995) purposefully vague in order to potentially include "sole
discretion" clauses. However, nothing in the legislative record indicates that
the legislature deviated from the expressed intent of the California Law Revi-
sion Commission to exclude these clauses from the coverage of § 1995.240.
129. See, e.g., California Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 598 P.2d
836 (Cal. 1979); Platt v. Superior Ct., 263 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34 (Ct. App. 1989).
130. See generally CAL. STATE SENATE, RULES COMMIrrEE ANALYSIS of May 3,
1989; CAL. STATE SENATE, RULES COMMITTEE ANALYsIS of Aug. 29, 1989; CAL.
STATE SENATE, JuDicIARY COMMITTEE ANALYsIs of May 16, 1989; and CAL.
STATE SENATE, JuDiciRY COMMITTEE ANALYSIS of Aug. 28, 1989.
131. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
132. See generally Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal 1985).
133. Recommendation, supra note 99, at 254.
134. Id. at 258.
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clauses. 135  The Senate's interpretation of California Civil
Code section 1995.250 is in accord with that of the Law Revi-
sion Commission, at least until the provision allowing "sole
discretion" clauses was eliminated.1 3 6
Many important policy considerations prompted the pro-
posal to allow "sole discretion" clauses in commercial leases.
First, both the landlord and the tenant have an interest in
avoiding litigation spawned by either interpretation of the
implied "reasonableness" standard or a challenge to a "sole
discretion" clause in the lease which is not supported by
law. 137 A second, related point is that the parties should be
able to rely on a negotiated provision. 138
Other concerns played a role in shaping the new legisla-
tion, such as the principle of freedom of contract.1 3 9 Parties
should be permitted to negotiate any appropriate provisions
to govern lease transfer, and be assured of their enforceabil-
ity.140 This is especially true when the two parties involved
possess equal bargaining power; where bargaining power is
unequal, general contract limitations such as unconscionabil-
ity, adhesion, etc., will remedy unfairness. 14 1
At some point between the second and third versions of
Senate Bill 536, however, the provision discussing "sole dis-
135. Id. at 267; see also CAL. STATE SENATE, S.B. 536 (draft version Feb. 17,
1989). This provision began as CAL. CIv. CODE § 1995.240(c) (West Supp. 1995).
136. See generally CAL. STATE SENATE, Rules Committee Analysis of May 3,
1989; CAL. STATE SENATE, Rules Committee Analysis of Aug. 29, 1989; CAL.
STATE SENATE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ANALYsis of May 16, 1989; and CAL.
STATE SENATE, JUDICIARY CoMMITrEE ANALYsis of Aug. 28, 1989.
137. Recommendation, supra note 99, at 255. Recall Kendall expressly left
unresolved whether "sole discretion" clauses were valid and enforceable in
commercial leases. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844 n.14
(Cal. 1985).
138. Recommendation, supra note 99, at 255. It is arguable that one cannot
rely on a "sole discretion" standard, as landlords are permitted to act arbitrar-
ily. However, with such a provision clearly stated in the lease, notice would be
given to the tenant that any transfer would depend on the landlord's permis-
sion. Thus, reliance on a negotiated lease provision is not necessarily reliance
upon a certain standard or condition but upon expectations that the clause will
be enforceable as agreed upon by both parties.
139. Id. at 257.
140. Id. at 257-58.
141. Id. at 258. In general, commercial lease parties are more likely to be
strong bargaining powers than are residential lease parties. Although in the
booming real-estate market of ten years ago, commercial tenants often exper-
ienced "take-it-or-leave-it" situations, the slumping market today engenders
arms-length negotiations where the lessees are at least as powerful as the
lessors.
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cretion" clauses was omitted. A note mentions that the Bill
was: "[a]mended in committee to specify that a landlord's con-
sent for transfer may be withheld subject to express condi-
tions (deleting a provision in the bill that would otherwise
allow a landlord to prohibit transfer without any reason)."
142
The analyses abruptly changed their summary and descrip-
tion of the Bill, but no reasons for the change were advanced.
It is possible that "sole discretion" clauses, which theo-
retically permit a landlord to unreasonably and arbitrarily
withhold consent to transfer, were not politically popular.
143
It is not recorded whether the Legislature faced pressure to
omit these provisions, or whether it simply decided to exclude
these provisions on the merits. However, it seems likely the
Legislature would mention its disapproval of these clauses if
they were meant to be substantively rejected. The lack of any
discussion suggests the Legislature purposely wrote the code
sections in an ambiguous manner to allow "sole discretion"
clauses, while avoiding their explicit authorization.
1 4 4
C. Interplay of California Civil Code Section 1951.4
Remedy
This section will explore what denial of the section
1951.4 remedy suggests about the validity of "sole discretion"
clauses, and will provide a practical guide to using the
remedy.
The preclusion of California Civil Code section 1951.4's
"lock-in" remedy for leases containing "sole discretion"
clauses suggests the Legislature wished to provide an incen-
tive for landlords to mitigate damages when tenants abandon
142. Non Residential Leases: Restrictions on Transfer, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY,
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, at 1 (Aug. 30, 1989).
143. Nathaniel Sterling, Assistant Executive Secretary of the California Law
Revision Commission, noted that the Assembly Judiciary Committee Chair and
several members did not want the legislature to clearly endorse the authoriza-
tion of unreasonable provisions. The Committee understood that its silence did
not answer the question of the validity of "sole discretion" clauses, and recog-
nized that litigation might be required to solve the issue. The Committee also
recognized that "sole discretion" clauses might occur and would probably be
valid, but could not place itself in a position of publicly endorsing these clauses.
Interview with Nathaniel Sterling, Assistant Executive Secretary of the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission (May 11, 1993).
144. An ambiguous drafting of the code sections would also permit the Legis-
lature to appear to bow to political pressure by omitting the section which ex-
plicitly permitted "sole discretion" clauses.
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the premises in violation of the lease without directly impos-
ing a duty to mitigate on all landlords as other jurisdictions
have done. 145 In leases that harshly restrict the tenant's
right to transfer, it may be more fair to prohibit the landlord
from collecting the full amount of rent due under the lease
without a duty to mitigate. Allowing this remedy in situa-
tions where the landlord may refuse consent for any reason
whatsoever may even encourage the landlord to refuse trans-
fer simply to lessen his or her burdens and responsibilities:
the landlord would be able to have the unit empty, but still
collect rent each month until the lease expired.
Though the Legislature may have disapproved of this
remedy for leases containing "sole discretion" clauses, this
does not mean the Legislature wished to invalidate "sole dis-
cretion" clauses themselves. In fact, there is no evidence
within the statutes of such an intention.146
1. How the Section 1951.4 "Lock-In" Remedy Works
Senate Bill 256 (1991) was enacted to clarify the Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1951.4 remedies for landlords and ten-
ants for violation of each other's transfer rights.14
Prior to the Bill's enactment, the law prohibited a land-
lord from invalidating a wrongful transfer without also termi-
nating the lease. The landlord could either: (1) terminate the
lease, or (2) allow the transfer and sue the tenant for dam-
ages. 148 The sparsity of these options sometimes deprived
the landlord of the benefit of his or her bargain, as he or she
145. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995), and comment thereto
20 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORT 275 (1990): "It should be noted that an unrea-
sonable restriction on transfer precludes the landlord's use of the remedy pro-
vided in CAL. CrV. CODE § 1951.4 (Deering Supp. 1992) (continuation of lease
after breach and abandonment)." New Jersey is one jurisdiction that has im-
ported such a duty to mitigate on all landlords.
146. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1995.010-1995.270 (West Supp. 1995). Nathaniel Sterling, Assistant Exec-
utive Secretary of the California Law Revision Commission, stated that the
Legislature recognized the possibility of "absolute discretion" clauses in leases,
but wanted to deny such clauses certain remedies. Interview with Nathaniel
Sterling, Assistant Executive Secretary of the California Law Revision Com-
mission (May 11, 1993).
147. CAL. STATE SENATE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ANALYSIS of Mar. 19, 1991,
at 3 (1991).
148. Id.
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was forced to incur additional expense in order to sue for
damages. 14
9
Senate Bill 256 allows the landlord to terminate a wrong-
ful transfer without terminating the underlying lease.
Therefore, the assignee or sublessee no longer has a right to
possession, though the original tenant retains this right. 50
Additionally, the original tenant and assignee are jointly and
severally liable for any damages caused by a wrongful assign-
ment.151 The tenant is also given rights under Senate Bill
256. If a landlord withholds consent to a transfer in violation
of provisions of the lease prohibiting the unreasonable with-
holding of consent, the tenant may terminate the lease or sue
for contract damages.
15 2
The remedies provided by California Civil Code section
1951.4 work in the following manner:
1. Is the breach caused by a landlord or tenant? If land-
lord, go to step 2. If tenant, go to step 11.
2. Does the lease provide for the California Civil Code
section 1951.4 remedy? The statute provides for the inclusion
of the following clause in order to secure such a remedy:
The lessor has the remedy described in California
Civil Code section 1951.4 (lessor may continue lease in ef-
fect after lessee's breach and abandonment and recover
rent as it becomes due, if lessee has right to sublet or as-
sign, subject only to reasonable limitations).'53
If yes, go to step 3. If no, this remedy is not available to the
landlord.
3. Has the lessor required compliance with an unrea-
sonable standard or condition, or unreasonably withheld his
or her consent to transfer? If yes, this remedy is not available
to the landlord. If no, continue to step 7. If unsure of the
reasonableness of the condition, proceed to step 4.
4. Is the condition in the lease restricting transfer un-
reasonable in the present circumstances? If yes, go to step 5.
If no, go to step 7.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5.
152. CAL. STATE SENATE, S.B. 256, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST, at§ (2)(a).
153. This clause is sanctioned by CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951.4(a) (West Supp.
1995) as an appropriate means of providing for the remedy within the lease.
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5. Was the condition in the lease reasonable when it
was originally created or the landlord does not require com-
pliance with it? If yes, go to step 7. If no, this remedy is not
available to the landlord. If unsure, go to step 6.
6. Examples of reasonable factors which the landlord
may consider include: (a) credit rating of transferee, (b) simi-
larity of previous use to proposed use, (c) nature or character
of transferee, (d) requirements of transferee for services from
landlord, and (e) impact of transferee on common utilities. 15
If reasonable restrictions, go to step 7. If unreasonable, the
landlord may not use this remedy.
7. Has the tenant breached the lease by violating one of
its terms, i.e., wrongfully transferred the leasehold interest,
and abandoned the premises? If yes, go to step 8. If no, this
remedy is not available to the landlord.
8. Was the tenant evicted or otherwise deprived of his
or her right to possession? If yes, the landlord cannot use this
remedy but may obtain contractual damages under Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1951.2. If no, go to step 10. If unsure,
go to step 9.
9. Did any of the following events occur: (a) landlord
acts of maintenance or preservation, (b) landlord efforts to
relet the property, (c) appointment of a receiver to protect the
landlord's interest under the lease, or (d) landlord withhold-
ing consent to transfer or termination of a transfer, not in
violation of the lease, and based on express and reasonable
standards or conditions? If yes, these acts do not terminate
the tenant's right to possession-go to step 10.155 If no, and
no other egregious acts interfered with the tenant's right to
possession, also go to step 10.
10. The landlord may choose between: (a) termination
of the lease and collection of contract damages under Califor-
nia Civil Code section 1951.2; or (b) terminate the transfer
but keep the lease in effect, do not disturb the tenant's right
to possession, and continue to collect rent from the tenant
under the terms of the lease.
11. Has the landlord withheld consent to a transfer in
violation of express or implied provisions of the lease prohib-
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995), Law Revision Comm'n
Comments.
155. These are listed in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4 (c) (West Supp. 1995) as
acts which "do not constitute a termination of the lessee's right to possession."
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iting the unreasonable withholding of consent? If no, the
tenant may sue only for contract damages. If yes, go to step
12.
12. The tenant may choose between: (a) the right to
contract damages, or (b) the right to terminate the lease.
156
V. PROPOSAL
A. A Practical Solution
In order to avoid potential litigation from placing a "sole
discretion" clause in a lease despite the uncertain state of the
law, a landlord may wish to phrase the restrictive provision
in a more legally acceptable manner.
If the landlord wishes to maximize his or her control of
the tenant's right to transfer, he or she may wish to use Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1995.230. This provision states: "A
restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may
absolutely prohibit transfer."' 57 Of course, the landlord
would be free to unilaterally waive this provision at a later
time if an acceptable transferee was presented. This solution
provides an enforceable method to restrict transfer. Unfortu-
nately, leases containing this provision may not receive the
benefits of the California Civil Code section 1951.4 remedy. 158
The landlord may also articulate the criteria which he or
she normally uses to select a tenant or approve a transferee,
and explicitly list them in the lease agreement. Any express
standard or condition, preferably objective in nature, is en-
forceable. 159 Of course, the standard may not be discrimina-
tory.16 0 This method, while sacrificing some landlord subjec-
tivity, is legitimate and retains the benefits of the California
Civil Code section 1951.4 remedy.
16 1
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.310 (West Supp. 1995).
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1995).
158. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995) and comment thereto,
20 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORTS 266 (1990).
159. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1995.240, 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995).
160. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1988).
161. The CAL. CrV. CODE § 1951.4 remedy is retained, provided that the re-
striction is reasonable. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1995.240, and comment thereto,
20 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORTS 275 (1990).
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B. Amendment to Legislation
In order to solve the ambiguities in the current law with
respect to "sole discretion" clauses, the California Civil Code
should be amended to include section 1995.250(c). This pro-
vision would state:
The landlord has absolute discretion to give or with-
hold consent, including the right to unreasonably with-
hold consent.
In addition, the words "including, but not limited to, either of
the following," presently in California Civil Code section
1995.250 would be amended to read: "including, but not lim-
ited to, any of the following."' 62
To make the "sole discretion" clauses more politically
palatable, the legislation should include a provision mandat-
ing that "sole discretion" clauses be placed separately within
the lease, in bold type, with an explanation of the effect of the
provision. The statement of effect might be phrased in the
following manner:
This clause permits the landlord to refuse consent to
transfer (assignment or sublease) for any reason whatso-
ever, even an arbitrary or unreasonable reason. The
landlord is under no obligation to state his or her reasons
for refusing a transfer.
These provisions would help to ensure that "sole discretion"
clauses are fairly negotiated and represent the intent of both
parties.
In order to obtain the remedy provided by California
Civil Code section 1951.4, another amendment must be en-
acted.16 3 This amendment should explicitly state that "sole
discretion" clauses are eligible for the section 1951.4 remedy.
The statute could be titled section 1951.4(d), and would per-
haps entail an amendment to section 1951.4(b)(2).16 4 The
new statute might be phrased in the following manner:
162. The changes indicated here are the provisions which the legislature
struck from Senate Bill 536 before it was enacted.
163. If such provisions are taken to ensure that a tenant receives notice of
the "sole discretion" clause, the landlord should be entitled to receive the sec-
tion 1951.4 remedy. The Legislature may wish to provide a disincentive to
these types of clauses by denying the remedy, but this judgment is better left to
landlord/tenant negotiations.
164. CAL. CMv. CODE § 1951.4 (b)(2) provides that any restrictive transfer
clauses must be "reasonable at the time the lease is executed" in order to obtain
the remedy. See CAL. CMv. CODE § 1951.4 (b)(2) (West Supp. 1995). Other por-
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The remedy described in this section is available to
leases containing "sole discretion" clauses, provided: the
clause is separated from other provisions of the lease, is in
bold print, and its effect is clearly explained within the
lease. If the tenant can affirmatively prove adhesion, un-
conscionability, or any other limitations on freedom of
contract, the remedy will not be available to the landlord.
This provision would permit leases containing "sole discre-
tion" clauses to obtain the section 1951.4 remedy.
Although some might argue it is unfair to allow this
"lock-in" remedy to lessors who severely restrict assignment
or sublease and saddle lessees for the full term of the lease,
this restrictiveness is something the tenant should bear in
mind when negotiating lease provisions. Both parties are
free to state in the lease that the section 1951.4 remedy will
not be available; in fact, under the statute, the remedy is not
available unless explicitly provided for in the lease.
165
V. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 536 was enacted to resolve the legal uncer-
tainties remaining after Kendall,166 but the process of
amendment left the final version unclear as to the status of
"sole discretion" clauses. The rejection of California Civil
Code section 1995.250(c), which would have authorized "sole
discretion" provisions, and the ambiguity of sections 1995.240
and 1995.250, make it unclear whether the landlord may en-
force commercial lease "sole discretion" clauses. 167 An addi-
tional factor which further clouds the issue is that the Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1951.4 remedy is not available to
leases containing "sole discretion" clauses, indicating possible
legislative disapproval. 168
Based on the legislative history of section 1995.250, it
seems the Legislature originally intended to allow "sole dis-
cretion" clauses in commercial leases so long as they are ex-
tions of the statute also mention "reasonableness" as a prerequisite to obtaining
the remedy. As "sole discretion" clauses are not necessarily reasonable, this
language would have to be adapted to accommodate "sole discretion" provisions.
165. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995).
166. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, 709 P.2d 837 (Cal 1985).
167. BARNEs & SALTER, supra note 4, at 21. See also CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 1995.240, 1995.250 (West Supp. 1995).
168. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951.4 (West Supp. 1995).
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plicitly stated. 169 However, the validity of these provisions
remains in question due to the lack of definitive legislative
pronouncements on this issue.
A legislative amendment pronouncing the validity of
"sole discretion" clauses is sorely needed. In addition, a pro-
vision authorizing use of the section 1951.4 remedy for leases
containing "sole discretion" clauses should be enacted. These
additions to the current law will ensure that freedom of con-
tract, rather than paternalistic regulation, prevails.
169. See supra notes 106-139 and accompanying text.
880 [Vol. 35
